The Status of Legislating and Adjudicating Death in Connecticut
By Cody N. Guarnieri, Law Clerk
Recently the Supreme Court of Connecticut released their opinion in State v. Rizzo.1 In late September of 1997 Todd Rizzo lured a thirteen-year-old boy into his backyard under the false pretenses of looking for snakes and bludgeoned him to death with a small sledgehammer. Mr. Rizzo plead guilty to murder in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-54a(a) and a Capital Felony under § 53a-54b. Rizzo was subsequently sentenced to death by a jury and, after a successful appeal, sentenced to death a second time by a three-judge panel. Mr. Rizzo subsequently appealed his conviction and sentence citing numerous legal grounds, one of which being that "the death penalty is a per se violation of the state constitution" as it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
The Defendant was essentially asserting that the court must consider national and state developments of law and policy on the issue of the death penalty in revisiting this issue. The court first reiterated the position it espoused in other recent opinions,2 stating that the death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the State or federal Constitutions and is implicitly provided for in the Connecticut constitution. However, the Court did accept the invitation to "look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
First, the Court found that the death penalty regime, as it exists in Connecticut, does not run afoul of the federal Constitutional requirements espoused by the United States Supreme Court in that it is not imposed for a non-homicide crime,3 is not applied against those who committed their offenses before reaching the age of eighteen4 and is not applied against those with a low range of intellectual functioning.5 On this basis, the Court found that the imposition of the death penalty in Connecticut was in conformity with "national societal mores."
The Court next considered the state of public opinion and societal norms within Connecticut related to the use of the death penalty. Ultimately, the Court stated that it is the job of the legislative and executive branches of the State government to assess the penological goals and efficacy of the death penalty within the State. As suggestive of the public will espoused through the legislative process, the Defendant pointed to the passage of Public Act 09-107 (an act repealing the death penalty) which was subsequently vetoed by former Governor Rell, as well as a similar bill which died before reaching the floor of the State Legislature in 2011. Nonetheless, the Court found these measures to be unconvincing and ineffectual, as neither provision came to fruition under the constraints of the legislative process. The Court ultimately went on to hold that
[A]s long as there remains powerful evidence of strong public support for the death penalty in the form of long-standing laws enacted by the democratically elected representatives of this state and other jurisdictions within the United States, we will not attempt to discern a contrary view of the public will, or to answer complex policy questions best answered by the legislative process, by choosing among the competing opinions of interest groups and individuals whose views are not necessarily in accord with those of the general population.
Recently Associate Justice Richard N. Palmer of the Connecticut Supreme Court, who joined the majority opinion in State v. Rizzo, was asked by this author if he could foresee the death penalty being judicially nullified. He responded, essentially reaffirming the Court's opinion in Rizzo, that as the Supreme Court is currently constituted, the legislative process would be the only way to effectuate such a change in the State.
1 No. SC 17572, slip op. (Conn. November 29, 2011).
2 See State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 680 A.2d 147 (1996); State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 873 A.2d 131 (2005).
3 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525 (2008).
4 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-71, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005).
5 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-21, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002).
